

















Intentional inexistence; narrow-scope quantification; mind-dependence; individuation; constitution


What’s in a (mental) picture
Alberto Voltolini

In this paper I present several interpretations of Brentano’s notion of the intentional inexistence of a mental state’s intentional object, that is, what that state is about. I hold moreover that, while all the interpretations in Sections 1-5 are wrong, the penultimate interpretation focused on in Section 6, according to which intentional inexistence amounts to the individuation of a mental state by means of its intentional object, is right provided that it is embedded in the fully correct interpretation given in Section 7. This is because it merely provides one of the necessary conditions for this last interpretation, in which intentional inexistence amounts to the constitution of a mental state by means of its intentional object. Finally, I argue that both these interpretations preserve the idea, which strikes everyone as true, that an intentional object exists in the mental state about it very much in the same way as a pictorial character exists in the picture (qua interpreted entity) that depicts it.

1.	Intentional inexistence as location in a mental state 

In a well-known passage in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Franz Brentano writes:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. (1995:88-9)

The notion of intentional inexistence that Brentano mobilizes here is notoriously unclear. What does it mean for an object to intentionally exist in a mental state? One might be tempted to read the prefix “in” added to the noun in its literally locative sense: an object is in a mental state very much like a bottle of beer is in the fridge. Brentano himself seems to justify this literal reading for immediately after the passage I have just quoted, he goes on to say: “Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself” (ibid.).​[1]​ It is clear enough, however, that he does not mean such an inclusion as a spatial inclusion since a few sentences later he says that such an inclusion is intentional: mental states are “those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves” (ibid. – my italics). Nor could anyone really pursue this spatial reading. The following argument is clearly invalid because though its premises are true, its conclusion is false:

1)	The smallest pebble lying in this university courtyard is in Turin.
2)	Turin is in my present thought.
3)	Hence, the smallest pebble lying in this university courtyard is in my present thought.

As just stated, although the premises of this argument are true its conclusion is false. For even if I am thinking of Turin, I am certainly not thinking of the smallest pebble in Turin University’s courtyard. The argument suffers from a fallacy of equivocation: while the preposition “in” in (1) has a literal locative meaning, this is not the case in (2). So, the “in” of intentional inexistence has no locative meaning.​[2]​

2.	Intentional inexistence as possible nonexistence

A traditional way of interpreting the notion of intentional inexistence is to appeal to the so-called possible nonexistence of the intentional object, the target a mental state is directed upon or is about. According to this interpretation, an object exists in the mental state about it iff it may not exist. This means there may be both mental states that are about objects that actually exist, as when I am thinking of Elizabeth II of Windsor, and mental states that are about objects that do not actually exist, as when I am thinking of Humbeth, the actually nonexistent offspring of Elizabeth II and Humbert II, the last king of Italy, or even when I am thinking of Twardy, the impossible wooden cannon made of steel, which unlike Humbeth not only does not actually exist but does not even exist possibly.​[3]​ 
However, although this is a quite popular interpretation,​[4]​ it cannot be the correct one. In Brentano, intentional inexistence has nothing to do with nonexistence. As Brentano stresses in the above quotation, intentional inexistence has rather to do with a modality of being that all intentional objects, not just prima facie nonexistent ones, possess: immanent objectivity, as Brentano puts it. For all intentional objects exist insofar as they are immanent (to be sure, in a nonspatial sense​[5]​) in the mental states themselves that are about them.​[6]​ 
Now, independently of Brentano’s true conception of intentional inexistence, the claim that all intentional objects ‘inexist’ is something that every theory of intentional inexistence must account for. Whatever the existential status that at least prima facie qualifies it (existent, non-existent, …), every intentional object is such that it must intentionally exist in the mental state that thinks of it.

3.	Intentional inexistence as narrow-scope existence

Thus, intentional inexistence affects all intentional objects, not merely those intentionalia that would be intuitively ranked as actually nonexistent. Nevertheless, one may think that, however one interprets the notion of intentional inexistence, the fact that we ascribe it to intentional objects is prompted by cases in which we  commonsensically tend to say that the intentional object in question does not exist, as in the Humbeth and Twardy examples.​[7]​ In this respect, one may well note that an intentional object exists in a mental state very much like a pictorial character– a pictum – exists in the picture that depicts it.​[8]​ For both pictures and mental states exhibit the intentional inexistence of their objects insofar as both are typically about objects that intuitively do not exist. This is how Gilbert Harman explains it:

Ponce de Leon searched Florida for the Fountain of Youth. […] He was looking for something. We can therefore say that his search had an intentional object. But the thing he was looking for, the intentional object of his search, did not (and does not) exist.
	A painting of a unicorn is a painting of something; it has a certain content. But the content does not correspond to anything actual; the thing that the painting represents does not exist. The painting has an intentional content in the relevant sense of ‘intentional’.
	Imagining or mentally picturing a unicorn is usefully compared with a painting of a unicorn. In both cases the content is not actual; the object pictured, the intentional object of the picturing, does not exist. It is only an intentional object. (1990:34)

This comparison between a mental state and a picture may be stressed even more if one defends the claim that a mental state is a picture: in an inner picture, i.e., a mental picture, its intentional object exists in the same way as in an outer picture. But in order to rely on such a comparison, it is not necessary to defend such an admittedly controversial claim. Even if one merely takes a mental state as a picture, one can still say that the mind simply internalizes what a picture exhibits publically, namely the fact that the relevant intentional object intentionally ‘inexists’. 
Yet of course, to simply say that an intentionale exists in a mental state very much like a pictum exists in the picture that depicts it seems just to push the problem of understanding what intentional inexistence amounts to one step further without resolving it. Unless of course, we have at our disposal a suitable interpretation of what it means for a pictum to exist in the picture that depicts it.
Now, it seems that there is such an interpretation to hand. Let me call it a lingualist interpretation. The reason I so label this interpretation is straightforward. According to it, one may see the intentional inexistence of a pictum to be linguistically rendered by locating, in the appropriate linguistic description of the situation in question, the relevant existential quantifier within the scope of a pictorial operator. A pictorial character PC intentionally exists in a picture P iff a sentence of the kind “according to the picture P, there is something identical with PC” is true in the mere narrow scope reading of the quantifier. In short, given the truth of so-called T-biconditionals of the form “‘p’ is true iff p”, a pictorial character PC intentionally exists in a picture P iff according to the picture P, there is something identical with PC. To stick to the example given by Harman in the above quotation, we may say that a unicorn exists in a picture iff according to that picture, there is a unicorn. If as to mental states things go in the same way, then we may also say that the intentional inexistence affecting targets of mental states is rendered by locating, in the appropriate linguistic description of the situation in question, the existential quantifier within the scope of a mental operator. An intentional object O intentionally exists in a mental state M iff a sentence of the kind “according to M, there is something identical with O” is true in the mere narrow scope reading of the quantifier. In short, an intentional object O intentionally exists in a mental state M iff according to M, there is something identical with O. For instance, a unicorn exists in a thought about it iff according to that thought, there is a unicorn.​[9]​ 
If we put it in these terms, to ascribe intentional inexistence to an intentional object is a way of saying that we are not really committed to intentional objects. For, as I said, the existential quantifier in the scope of a pictorial/mental operator is a quantifier in a narrow scope position. Unlike with a wide scope position, in narrow scope the existential quantifier carries no ontological commitment.
One might now think that the easiest way to justify lingualism is to once again appeal to the nonexistence of intentional objects both of mental states and of pictures. If someone believes that there is something that is such and such, or a picture depicts that there is such a something, and yet this very something does not exist, one cannot infer from such a believing or depicting that there is something such that one believes or depicts that it is such and such.
Certainly, it is debatable whether the nonexistence of an intentional object really blocks that inference. As to depictions, one may well hold that when they are about a particular character, there is always a character they depict, independently of whether it exists. So, from the fact that, for example, in La Gioconda the particular pictorial character Mona Lisa smiles, we can infer that there is something such that according to La Gioconda it smiles, even though it does not exist.​[10]​ Mutatis mutandis, the same holds if one believes that Mona Lisa smiles. 
Granted, in order for the above to hold, one has to interpret the existential quantifier in such a wide scope reading as being non-existentially loaded, that is, as ranging over both entities that exist and entities that do not exist.​[11]​ Many refrain from such an endorsement. Yet for the purpose of ruling out this justification, one does not even need to endorse such an interpretation. It is enough to stress, as we have already seen, that intentional inexistence has to affect all intentional objects, hence also those that we would intuitively qualify as existing. Yet, with respect to the latter objects the inference from the narrow scope reading to the wide scope reading of the existential quantifier in the relevant sentence raises no problem, both in the pictorial and in the mental case. From the fact that in Jacques-Louis David’s painting Napoleon Crossing the Alps Napoleon gets to the other side of the Alps, we can infer that there was someone who according to that painting got to the other side of the Alps, that is, Napoleon himself. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the corresponding belief.​[12]​ Clearly enough, both David’s painting and such a belief are about Napoleon; in other words, Napoleon is their intentional object.​[13]​ 
	However, lingualists can deploy a better justification as to why intentional inexistence has to be merely read as existence in narrow scope. As Elisabeth Anscombe originally noted, intentional objects are affected by a certain indeterminacy. While I cannot hit a man without hitting a man of a given height, I can well think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height.​[14]​ Once again, the same holds for pictorial subjects, as Ned Block maintains: if I depict a stick figure of a man, this figure does not go into the matter of clothing at all.​[15]​ Now, indeterminacy may well be a reason why it is not legitimate to export the existential quantifier from narrow to wide scope in the relevant sentences, hence to be committed to intentionalia. This is clearly the case when mental operators are at stake. If when faced with a mutilated corpse, Smith forms the mere conviction that the(re is a unique) murderer (and that s/he) was cruel, one cannot infer from such a conviction that there is someone who Smith is thinking of that was cruel. While the first statement is true, the second statement may well be false. For, even if it turns out that there is such a murderer, there is no definite individual Smith has in mind.​[16]​ Moreover, nothing substantial would change if Smith gave a depictive form to his conviction. From the fact that according to a picture the(re is a unique) murderer (who) was cruel it does not follow that there is someone who according to that picture is cruel.
However, note first of all that, in order for the inference from an operator-containing sentence with an existential quantifier in narrow scope to the corresponding operator-containing sentence with an existential quantifier in wide scope to fail, the indeterminacy in question must be ontological, namely, a case of objectual vagueness: it is indeterminate whether object O and object O’ are the same entity. In such a predicament, an inference of the above kind fails outright. For instance, since being a unique golden mountain provides no criterion of identity for merely possible entities, it is ontologically indeterminate whether the merely possible entity that is the only golden mountain in a possible world W is the same as the merely possible entity that is the only golden mountain in another possible world W’. Consequently, from the fact that it is possible that there uniquely is a golden mountain we cannot infer that there is something that possibly is a unique golden mountain.​[17]​ Yet Anscombe’s characterization of intentional objects does not mobilize ontological indeterminacy but, rather, epistemological indeterminacy, a notion to be rendered as follows: for any property F, whenever a subject S / a picture P represents O, it may not be the case that (s)he/it represents O as having F or as not having F. Manifestly, epistemological indeterminacy does not entail ontological indeterminacy: the fact that something is represented as indeterminate with respect to some properties does not mean that it is vague. So, the fact that intentional objects are characterized by epistemological indeterminacy does not justify the claim that whenever the appropriate linguistic description of a mental or a pictorial situation concerns such objects, there is a failure of inference from a narrow scope reading to a wide scope reading as regards the existential quantifier involved in that description. There is, therefore, still no justification for the idea that intentional inexistence has to be understood in terms of such a failure.
To be sure, the aforementioned cases of Smith’s having mental states or depicting pictures concerning the murderer are cases in which the quantifier exportation fails. More in general, all cases of so-called generic pictures, pictures whose subject is generic, are cases in point. Take as an example Turner’s Rain, Steam, and Speed, which represents some locomotive or other moving forward along a bridge against a landscape background. From the fact that in Turner’s painting there is a locomotive moving forward we cannot infer that there is something that according to Turner’s painting moves forward. The same holds for many mental states whose content is likewise generic. For instance, Diogenes’ famous quest for an honest man does not amount to the fact that there was someone that Diogenes was looking for.​[18]​ Indeed, all such cases are affected by ontological indeterminacy. It is indeterminate whether the locomotive whose movement would make true Turner’s painting in a certain possible world is the same as the locomotive whose movement would make true Turner’s painting in another possible world. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the honest man that would satisfy Diogenes’ quest in a certain possible world and of the honest man that would satisfy Diogenes’ quest in another possible world. Yet as we have already seen, in many other cases affecting either pictures or mental states (e.g. the previous Napoleon example), the relevant inference from the narrow scope reading to the wide scope reading of the existential quantifier is valid. Now, it must be remembered once again that intentional inexistence is said to characterize all intentional objects. So even in all these other cases, the relevant intentional objects (Napoleon in our example) exist in the respective pictures or mental states. Since in all such cases with respect to the relevant pictorial or intentional sentence we are allowed to infer a wide scope reading of the existential quantifier from the narrow scope reading, intentional inexistence cannot be understood by appealing to the mere narrow scope reading of the existential quantifier in the relevant sentence. Hence, intentional inexistence cannot be rendered by the lingualist idea that the relevant sentence mobilizes a mere narrow scope reading of the existential quantifier.

4.	Intentional inexistence as mind-dependent existence

At this point, in order to understand the notion of intentional inexistence it is better to look elsewhere. As I have already recalled, in the very characterization of the notion Brentano himself gives in the aforementioned quotation from Psychology, intentional inexistence is said to be “immanent objectivity”, namely, the fact that the intentional object is immanent to the mental state itself that is about it. One may naturally interpret this idea of immanence in terms of an existential dependence relation. According to this interpretation, whenever one thinks, one does not think of a transcendent, that is mind-independent, entity, which in many cases is what it seems to be (for instance, when one is thinking of Elizabeth II, it seems that one’s thought is directed upon the flesh-and-blood English Queen). Rather, one thinks of a mind-dependent entity, a thought-of entity as some might say: in other words, an entity whose existence somehow depends on the existence of the mind that thinks of it (a contemplated Queen, in our example).​[19]​ In turn, this notion of existential dependence that allegedly accounts for intentional inexistence is traditionally rendered in modal terms.​[20]​ An intentional object exists in a mental state in the sense that it modally depends on the existence of that state for its existence: necessarily, if the intentional object exists, then the mental state that thinks of it exists as well. In a nutshell, intentional inexistence is the modally dependent existence of an intentional object on a mental state.
	Once again, this interpretation seems to preserve the idea that both in the case of pictures and in the case of mental states their respective objects intentionally exist in them. For one can well say not only that an intentional object exists in a mental state iff it modally depends for its existence on the existence of such a state, but also that a pictorial character intentionally exists in the picture that depicts it solely in the case in which it modally depends for its existence on the existence of such a picture. Consider again Mona Lisa. Surely enough, if La Gioconda had not existed, Mona Lisa would not have existed either. Therefore, Mona Lisa exists in La Gioconda iff the former modally depends on the latter for its existence. This is how some students of Brentano took the notion of intentional inexistence in terms of immanent objectivity to be read.​[21]​
	Unlike the previous one, according to this interpretation it is possible to existentially quantify on intentional objects. Whenever one says that one thinks or a picture depicts, there is something one is thinking or a picture is depicting. One thereby gives a wide scope reading of the quantifier occurring in that mode of saying.
This result will be preserved in all the following interpretations of intentional inexistence. The present interpretation has nonetheless a further, specific, consequence. Once the intentional inexistence of an intentional object is taken to amount to its mind-dependence, one can give a stronger reading of the indeterminacy of an intentional object than the epistemological reading that Anscombe’s account mobilizes. However, this reading is not so strong as the ontological reading of such an indeterminacy, which amounts to the vagueness of the intentional object itself. Rather, it simply says that an intentional object, qua immanent hence mind-dependent object, is metaphysically indeterminate, in the sense that it is incomplete: for some pair of properties P and its complement non-P, an intentional object has neither P nor non-P.​[22]​ So, the man Anscombe is thinking of without thinking of his height is incomplete for he is neither 2m tall nor non-2m tall. This again fits with the relevant comparison in intentional inexistence between mental states and pictures. For one can well say that pictorial subjects exhibit the same kind of incompleteness. Mona Lisa, for example, is neither Florentine nor non-Florentine.
	Yet if one really wants to render the idea that an intentional object is an immanent object in terms of a dependence relation, it is insufficient to simply say that an intentional object is a mind-dependent entity. One has to proceed further in characterizing this relation, for there are plenty of mind-dependent entities that are  however hardly characterizable as immanent entities. Consider institutions, laws and nations, or social entities more generally. Clearly enough, any such entity is a mind-dependent entity: in a world of thoughtless individuals, there would be no such entity. Yet it is not an entity immanent to the mind, or minds, that thinks of it.
	So, if one wants to account properly for an entity being an immanent entity in terms of dependence relations, the most natural thing to say is that an immanent entity depends not only historically, but also constantly, on the very same depending entity. On the one hand, historical dependence accounts for a dependent entity coming into existence: in order for the dependent entity to come into existence, another entity must already exist. On the other hand, constant dependence accounts for a dependent entity persisting in existence: in order for the dependent entity to persist, another entity must exist at every moment in which the former entity exists.​[23]​ Thus, the immanence of an entity is rendered by the fact that a dependent entity depends both historically and constantly on the very same depending entity. Thus, not only an immanent entity comes into existence in virtue of the existence of another entity, but it also ceases to exist once that further entity expires as well. In a nutshell, the depending entity is responsible both for the birth and for the death of the dependent entity.
	At first sight, this account is plausible for pictorial characters. If a certain picture ceases to exist, its pictum ceases to exist as well. Precious paintings are protected by unbreakable glass precisely because if those paintings were destroyed, their picta would not survive. Yet a moment’s reflection shows that such plausibility is debatable. Many portraits of fictional characters are about entities that, though they historically depend on such portraits, appearances notwithstanding survive the destruction of such portraits. Mickey Mouse, for one, has certainly survived Disney’s first cartoon of him: even if that cartoon no longer existed, Mickey is still among us. Only a sustainer of a voodoo metaphysics,​[24]​ moreover, would believe that tearing a photo of a person they hate into pieces would make that very person die. In fact, immanentists of this kind about pictures are forced to implausibly maintain that a painting of a real individual does not portray such an individual, but just a depicted surrogate (a depicted Napoleon in our previous example). Furthermore, this account is certainly not plausible for intentional objects of mental states. For it makes such objects unshareable: neither different people nor one and the same thinking subject at different times may share the same intentional object in their thoughts. 
At the time of the first volume of his Psychology (1874) Brentano would have probably been happy with this result. For he seems to have believed then that the intentional objects mental states are about are phenomenal entities, entities that exist only when one is experiencing them.​[25]​ Independently of whether the ascription of such a belief to Brentano is correct,​[26]​ however, he himself would have later rejected this way of intending immanentism. As he then said, when a picture depicts a real individual it does not depict a depicted counterpart. Analogously, when one is thinking about that individual one is not thinking about a thought-of surrogate.​[27]​

5.	Intentional inexistence as monadic intentionality

At this point, one may suspect that what is wrong with the previous proposal is its relational account; that is, the idea that an intentional object exists in a mental state insofar as there is one such object that state is in a (dependence) relation with. What if to intentionally inexist for an intentional object means rather for its mental state to possess intentionality as a monadic property, namely, as a certain way for that state to be modified, a way suitably rendered by an adverbial description of such a state? Thus, commitment to, hence relation with, an intentional object is no longer required to account for intentional inexistence. If this is the case, when Ponce de Leon thinks of the Fountain of Youth, there is no (dependent) thing such a thought enters into a relation with. Rather, his thought is simply modified ‘fountainyouthily’, so to speak. Likewise, if Ponce had depicted ‘it’.​[28]​
	To be sure, this adverbialist proposal has to deny that a relation between an intentional object and its mental state holds in the case not only of nonexistent, but also of existent, intentionalia. As we have seen previously, this is hard to swallow.​[29]​ Yet adverbialism has to face a more serious problem. At first sight, both a thought of the Fountain of Youth and a thought of Nessie (to say nothing of the corresponding pictures) share a property, namely, their being about something. Yet in the adverbialist reconstruction, such thoughts are merely differently modified. The first thought has the monadic property of being-intentionally-directed-fountainyouthily, while the second thought has the monadic property of being-intentionally-directed-Nessiely.​[30]​ As the use of dashes in the description of the properties should make manifest, such properties have nothing in common.​[31]​
	The adverbialist would deny this negative conclusion. For him/her, the two monadic properties are just two species of the same genus, two determinates of the same determinable, being-intentionally-directed-somehow.​[32]​ But this reply does not grasp the problem. The point is that, intuitively, the two thoughts exactly share the same property, they do not merely come under the same genus. In this respect, their relationship is closer to the one concerning, say, someone kicking a ball and someone kicking a child, rather than to the one concerning, say, a body having a certain temperature and another body having another temperature. True enough, in the latter case the two bodies exemplify different species coming under one and the same genus, that is, having a temperature. Yet in the former case, the two actions in question are both instances of kicking, not merely species of the same genus, say being a purposive action; as would rather be the case if, say, it were a question of kicking something and caressing something. Any reconstruction that said that the two actions are just simply kinds of purposive actions would lose something. 
	All in all, therefore, ruling out the relationality of intentional mental states does not seem the right way to account for intentional inexistence. Instead, one must look for the right kind of relation.

6.	Intentional inexistence as individuation

Coming back therefore to a relationalist reading of intentional inexistence, one may however wonder on behalf of Brentano whether interpreting immanentism in terms of a dependence relation rendered in modal terms is sufficient. One may indeed suppose that, taken as immanent existence, the intentional inexistence of the intentional object is rendered by the fact that the object depends on the mental state that is about it not only for its existence, but also for its individuation. In this account, an intentional object exists in the mental state that thinks of it iff the former is individuated in terms of the latter, in the sense that a certain mental state’s being about a certain object affects the nature of that object: if the object were not what the mental state is about, it would be a different entity. 
	Probably, reading “a exists in b” as “b individuates a” is the right, reinforced, reading of Brentano’s immanentism. This is because it thoroughly accounts for his phenomenalism, namely for the fact that for him the physical events mental states are about are just phenomenal events.​[33]​ If for example, a certain sound, taken as a certain phenomenal event, were not what a certain auditory experience is about, then it would not be that very sound.
	Clearly enough, however, this interpretation merely aggravates the problems that the thesis of the constant dependence of intentionalia gives rise to. Suppose that an intentional object became a different entity if it were not intended by a certain mental state. Then it would be even more clearly unshareable by different people or even by one and the same thinking subject at different times.
Yet no such problem arises if one reads the individuative relation that intentional inexistence allegedly picks out in the opposite direction. According to this reading, intentional objects exist in mental states in the sense that those very states are individuated (at least in part) in terms of them. In other words, it belongs to the nature of a certain mental state that it is about a certain object: if it were not about that object, it would not be that mental state.​[34]​ 
Here one may say again that this sense of intentional inexistence equates mental states with pictures as to their individuation. For, if one takes a picture not merely as a certain material object in the world but as an interpreted entity, that is, as a meaningful representation, a picture may be individuated in terms of the object it is about very much like a mental state is individuated by the object it is about. Consider again La Gioconda not merely as a certain canvas hung on a wall in the Louvre, but as a picture of Mona Lisa. Clearly enough, if it were not about Mona Lisa, it would not be the same painting. Simply, one may add that while pictures are individuated in terms of the objects they are about only insofar as they are taken as interpreted entities, as entities-cum-meaning, mental states are instead straightforwardly individuated in such terms since they possess intentionality on their sleeves. As many say, unlike pictures their intentionality is original and not derived.​[35]​ 
A clear advantage of this interpretation is that, unlike all the previous interpretations, it really conserves the idea that intentional inexistence affects all intentional objects. Every intentional object intentionally exists in the mental state that is about it insofar as it contributes to the individuation of that mental state. Not only Elizabeth II individuates a thought about her but also Humbeth, her nonexistent son, individuates the corresponding thought about him.
Here one might immediately wonder: how can something that does not exist individuate a mental state by so being in a relation with it? If an intentional object does not exist, there is no such thing; hence there is nothing that state can be in a relation of individuation with. One should not, however, be led astray here by the problem of nonexistence. As Tim Crane first pointed out, an intentional object is a schematic object, namely, an object that has no nature insofar as it is thought of.​[36]​ Put in more positive terms, schematic objects are entities that have a nature which may well vary from one schematic object to another, but it is not determined by the fact that such objects are thought of.​[37]​ So, there may be thoughts about concrete entities – for example, an actually spatiotemporal individual such as Napoleon – very much like thoughts about nonconcrete entities – for example, an utterly non-spatiotemporal entity such as the Napoleonic Code. For, although those entities have a different nature, in the thoughts that respectively think of them they are just intentional objects, mere targets of such thoughts. True enough, it may turn out that entities of a certain nature are not allowed to figure in the overall ontological domain of what there is. For instance, fictionalists about numbers reject any ontological commitment to numbers. Now, if we accept such a rejection, this simply entails that mental states apparently about such entities are about different things that are really there. As a result, they will be individuated by the latter things. In my previous example, if there are no numbers, thoughts apparently about them are rather individuated in terms of other entities such thoughts are really about and that are really there, namely certain make-believe practices. Now, insofar as nonexistent things may well belong to kinds of entities that are admitted in the overall domain of what there is, thoughts that think of them may really be individuated by them, independently of the fact that they do not exist.​[38]​ This may clearly be the case not only with our thought of (the nonexistent) Superman, if Superman is a fictional entity and we allow for ficta,​[39]​ but also with our thought of (the nonexistent) Humbeth, if Humbeth is a merely possible spatiotemporal individual and we allow for mere possibilia. All in all, therefore, a mental state can well stand in a relation of individuation with an intentional object that does not exist. For there really is such an object,​[40]​ provided it belongs to a kind of thing that already belongs to the overall ontological domain.​[41]​
In a nutshell, as well as immanentism in all its forms, the individuative conception of intentional inexistence allows for quantifying over intentional objects, independently of whether they exist. In this sense, quantification over such objects is existentially unloaded: it is merely particular (or partial) quantification, as some put it.​[42]​ If an intentional object individuates the mental state about it, then there is something that individuates such a state. In this respect, this quantification is the mark of ontological commitment, as Quine is well known to be held.​[43]​ Yet one can really quantify over intentional objects, hence be committed to them, only insofar as they belong to a kind of entity which one can independently quantify over, hence one is independently committed to. In other words, quantification over, hence commitment to, intentional objects, is parasitic on quantification over, hence commitment to, entities that have the same nature as such intentionalia. This result will also be preserved in the next and final interpretation of intentional inexistence.

7.	Intentional inexistence as constitution

What I have just done, then, is to reverse the direction of interpretation in the relevant reading of intentional inexistence. In accounting for intentional inexistence, instead of holding the idea that intentional objects have to be individuated in terms of the mental states that think of them, I rather stick to the opposite idea that such mental states have to be individuated in terms of their intentional objects. 
Yet at this point one might wonder why, in order to perform such a reversal, one really needs to read intentional inexistence as the relation of individuation of mental states in terms of intentional objects. Cannot one read intentional inexistence as the weaker relation of mere existential dependence, but now taken as a modal dependence of mental states on such objects, rather than as the converse modal dependence of intentional objects on mental states (as in the aforementioned Brentano form of immanentism)? Why does one need to say that an intentional object exists in a mental state iff the latter is individuated in terms of the former rather than simply saying that such an inexistence occurs iff there cannot be the latter without the former?​[44]​
	The reason is straightforward: modally conceived existential dependence of the mental state on its intentional object is not fine-grained enough to account for intentional inexistence. Consider two entities which are mutually existentially dependent, in the sense that both the former cannot exist without the latter and the latter cannot exist without the former as, for example, Socrates and his singleton. Moreover, suppose that someone is thinking of Socrates. We would like to say that Socrates, not his singleton, exists in such a thought. Yet because of the above predicament we have that such a thought depends for its existence both on Socrates and on his singleton: necessarily, if there is such a thought, there are both Socrates and his singleton.​[45]​ So, nothing weaker than individuation of the mental state in terms of its intentional object may account for the fact that the latter intentionally exists in the former.
	However, one may also wonder whether something stronger than individuation of the mental state in terms of its object is needed to account for intentional inexistence. According to Johannes Brandl, this is precisely the case. For Brandl, intentional inexistence has to be interpreted as the idea that the intentional object is a necessary part of the mental state that thinks of it.​[46]​ 
This mereological conception of intentional inexistence is certainly stronger than the individuative conception. In order for something just to individuate something else, it does not have to be a part of it, let alone a necessary part. Moreover, one may well concede that this mereological conception is definitely needed in order to correctly account for intentional inexistence. For the individuative conception is not enough, as again the case of Socrates and his singleton may well show. As Kit Fine maintains,​[47]​ although Socrates and his singleton are mutually dependent entities, there clearly is one sense according to which Socrates is prior to his singleton. This is precisely the individuative sense. Unlike Socrates, Socrates’ singleton needs Socrates for its individuation: if there were no Socrates, Socrates’ singleton would not be the thing it is – but not the other way around. Yet clearly enough Socrates does not intentionally exist in his singleton since it can be argued that although in his individuative role Socrates is a member of his singleton, he is no part of it, let alone a necessary part of it.​[48]​
	It is, however, hard to see this proposal as yielding an individually sufficient condition for intentional inexistence. For one thing, an intentional object being a necessary part of the mental state that thinks of it might even be read back in terms of the already rejected Brentanian forms of immanentism, those according to which the intentional object either modally depends on or is individuated in terms of the mental state that thinks of it. Indeed, that object might be a necessary part of that state and still modally depend on or be individuated in terms of it. 
So, the natural suggestion is to take the individuative conception and the mereological conception as providing the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for intentional inexistence. An intentional object exists in the mental state that is about it iff i) the former individuates the latter ii) the former is a necessary part of the latter, if it exists. According to this idea, I can say that intentional inexistence is the very relation of constitution of the mental state in terms (at least in part) of its intentional object. For that object not only individuates the state but is also a necessary part of it, if it exists, qua one of its constituents. This prevents not only Socrates, who merely individuates his singleton, from intentionally existing in such a singleton, but also a thought-of Socrates, who (if there were any) could be a necessary part of the relevant thought but definitely does not individuate it, from intentionally existing in it.​[49]​
Once again, this way of putting things equates mental states and pictures as to their individuation. For qua interpreted entities, entities-cum-meaning, pictures have pictorial characters among their constituents: the latter both individuate and are necessary parts of the former, if such pictures exist. Also, insofar as the intentional object that exists in a mental state stands in a relation of constitution with such a state, this intentional object can again be quantified over, hence be committed to. As we have already seen, if the object individuates the state, then there is something that individuates the latter. Since, moreover, constitution is just a stronger relationship than individuation, whatever ontological commitment individuation involves, it is also involved by constitution.
As a final consequence of this idea, the intentional existence of the object in the mental state about it is nothing other than the converse of the property of intentionality itself, the property for that very mental state of being about its object. For intentionality itself may well be conceived as the very relation for that state of being constituted by its intentional object. This consequence would certainly fit in with Brentano’s original desideratum. For in the quotation from Psychology we started from, he keeps intentional inexistence and intentionality together. To quote that passage again, “every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call [...] direction towards an object.”​[50]​ Granted, however, this is a topic for another story.​[51]​
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^1	  Notoriously, this passage also shows that Brentano held that intentionality, or aboutness, is the mark of the mental, in the sense that something is a mental state iff it is an intentional state, i.e., it possesses intentionality. Yet in this paper I remain neutral on this issue. From now onwards, read “mental state” as simply synonymous with “mental state endowed with intentionality”. 
^2	  Cf. also Brandl (1996:266).
^3	  The Twardy example comes from Twardowski (1977:101).
^4	  Cf. e.g. this passage from Haugeland and Dennett: “A belief can be about Paris, but a belief can also apparently be about phlogiston –– and there is no phlogiston for it to be about. This curious fact, the possible non-existence of the object of an intentional item, may seem to be an idle puzzle, but in fact it has proven extraordinarily resistant to either solution or dismissal. Brentano called this the intentional inexistence of the intentional objects of mental states.” (1978:384).
^5	  As we have already seen, the spatial interpretation of intentional inexistence is utterly incorrect.
^6	  As has been definitively clarified by Crane (2006).
^7	  According to Segal (2005:283-4), these cases prompted Brentano to defend his admittedly immanentist theory of intentional objects. 
^8	  This idea can be traced back at least to Scruton (1970-71:205). See also Haugeland and Dennett (1987:384).
^9	  Though only implicit, one may find such an interpretation in Fauconnier (1985). This interpretation has been revived very recently by Kroon (2013).
^10	  For this point see, e.g., Hyman (2006:66fn.12).
^11	  As I defended, for example, in Voltolini (2005).
^12	  On this see Crane (2001:18).
^13	  As I anticipated in fn. 9, Kroon (2013) holds that there is room to interpret in lingualist terms Brentano’s original idea of intentional inexistence of an intentional object, i.e., the idea he presented in 1874 at the time of the first volume of his Psychology. Yet Kroon himself seems to acknowledge that when this interpretation undisputedly fits in with some parts of what Brentano later said, namely at the time (1911) of the second volume of Psychology, it provides a suitable approach, one that was acceptable to Brentano himself at that time, only for the cases in which the intentional object of one’s thought intuitively does not exist. For when such an object intuitively exists, also for the Brentano of 1911 another story must be told (cf. ibid:383-4). Yet this amounts to saying that lingualism does not give the right account of intentional inexistence if this feature affects all intentional objects, both those that (intuitively) do not exist and those that (intuitively) exist.
^14	  Cf. Anscombe (1961:161).
^15	  Cf. Block (1983:655).
^16	  On this point cf. Smith and McIntyre (1982:30-1).
^17	  I have defended this argument in Voltolini (2000).
^18	  As Chisholm (1967:201) originally envisaged.
^19	  For this, rather traditional, interpretation of Brentano’s position see e.g. Smith and McIntyre (1982:47-51).
^20	  For this account, see e.g. Mulligan and Smith (1986). 
^21	  Cf. Brandl (1996:276).
^22	  For this notion of incompleteness cf e.g. Castañeda (1989:179), Parsons (1980:56,183-4).
^23	  For these definitions cf. Thomasson (1999:30-1).
^24	  This notion comes from Walton (1990:385).
^25	  Cf. Crane (2006).
^26	  Kroon (2013:389 fn.15) rightly points out that in (1966) Brentano said he had never defended this form of immanentism.
^27	  Cf. Brentano (1966:77, 95-6).  Harman has recently defended the same point. Cf. (1990:36).
^28	  For this proposal, see Kriegel (2007, 2011). For Kriegel the pictorial case is admittedly more complicated since it involves the ascription of a derivative form of intentionality to pictures. See his (2011:chap.5).
^29	  Kriegel (2011) tries to account for this problem by allowing for a veridical mental state to also entertain a relation with the existent object it is causally connected with. Such a relation grounds the possession for that state of its monadic intentionality property.
^30	  I here follow Kriegel’s (2011) way of putting it.
^31	  On a variant of this problem see Voltolini (2009:141-4).
^32	  Cf. Kriegel (2011).
^33	  Cf. Crane (2006).
^34	  This is the interpretation of intentional inexistence Crane himself apparently defends: see (2001:29). I say “apparently” for two reasons. First of all, since Crane basically believes that there are no nonexistent intentionalia, a thought about a nonexistent intentionale is for him not relational. Hence it can at most be identified but not individuated in terms of its intentional object; the description of such a state as being about that object distinguishes that state from any other such states. Crane himself admits this (2001:31). Indeed, in his proper theory of intentionality, a mental state is individuated by its intentional content: any mental state has its own intentional content independently of whether there really is the intentionale it is about (2001:32). Moreover, in order for such an appeal to individuation to account for intentional inexistence, it must account for our saying that an intentional object is in the state that is about it, but not for the converse idea that the state is in the object it is about. Yet Crane sometimes appeals to intentional individuation to account for the latter idea: see (2001:82-3).
^35	  Cf. e.g. Dretske (1995), Fodor (1987), Searle (1983).
^36	  Cf. Crane (2001).
^37	  I read Crane’s idea of schematicity in these terms in Voltolini (2013).
^38	  I have defended these points in Voltolini (2009, 2013).
^39	  As all realists about fictional entities believe: see e.g. Thomasson (1999).
^40	  Of course, if the case in question mobilized an impossible relation to no relata, it would conceptually be a very complicated case. But the case in question is simply the case of a relation to nonexistent relata. That there is no conceptual problem with relations to nonexistents provided that there already are such nonexistent relata has been recently argued also by Priest (2005:60 fn.7).
^41	  As I have claimed in Voltolini (2007).
^42	  Cf. e.g. McGinn (2000:32-7).
^43	  To be sure, Quine notoriously took such a quantification as existentially loaded quantification. See Quine (1952). For some reasons as to why this quantification must be taken as merely particular quantification (thereby severed from a first-order property of existence that only some entities possess), see Voltolini (2012).
^44	  Aforementioned Mulligan and Smith (1986) goes exactly in this direction.
^45	  On this problem see Sacchi and Voltolini (2012).
^46	  Cf. Brandl (1996:274). Clearly enough, an intentional object being merely a contingent part of the thought would not account for intentional inexistence. Not only would we risk falling again into the wrong locative interpretation of intentional inexistence, but also we would mobilize something definitely weaker than the relation of individuation of the mental state in terms of its object.
^47	  Cf. Fine (1995:271,279).
^48	  Granted, unless one reconstructs set-theory in mereological terms, à la Lewis (1991).
^49	  The clause “if the state exists” further distinguishes my proposal from Brentanian immanentism. Qua constituent of a mental state, an intentional object is part of it only wherever there is such a state. This allows for that object to figure also in a possible world where there is not such a state. On the contrary, Brentanian immanent objects entail the existence of the states of which they are necessary parts.
^50	  Some people have taken this quotation quite literally as saying that intentional inexistence and intentionality are one and the same thing (see e.g. Aquila 1977:17). Yet I prefer to say that intentionality is the converse of intentional inexistence: intentional inexistence is the property of an intentional object to constitute the mental state that thinks of it, intentionality is the property of a mental state to be constituted by its intentional object.
^51	  I hold this idea along with Elisabetta Sacchi in our Sacchi and Voltolini (2012). I thank Elisabetta, Carola Barbero, Fred Kroon and Alessandro Torza for some valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.
